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Abstract 
We present the Canberra-Hamburg Integrated Model for Population (CHIMP), a new global 
population model for long-term projections. Distinguishing features of this model, compared 
to other model for secular population projections, are that (a) mortality, fertility, and 
migration are partly driven by per capita income; (b) large parts of the model have been 
estimated rather than calibrated; and (c) the model is in the public domain. Scenario 
experiments show similarities but also differences with other models. Similarities include 
rapid aging of the population and an eventual reversal of global population growth. The main 
difference is that CHIMP projects substantially higher populations, particularly in Africa, 
primarily because our data indicate a slower fertility decline than assumed elsewhere. Model 
runs show a strong interaction between population growth and economic growth, and a weak 
feedback of climate change on population growth. 
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Population growth is one of the main drivers of global change. Resource use is given by 
resource use per capita times the number of people, emissions by emissions per capita times 
the number of people. Projections of population are therefore a key component of scenarios 
that drive models of global change. Yet, there is little discussion on population projections. 
Most analysts
1 simply adopt the projections generated by a small group of demographers 
                                                 
1 SGM/MiniCAM, IMAGE and AIM are exceptions to this rule. These modelling teams have their own, little 
publicised population model. interested in the long run, that is, Lutz et al. (2004), UN (2003), US Census Bureau (2003), 
and World Bank (2002). 
At the same time, demographic models are largely self-contained. However, there is little 
reason to assume that population is independent of other drivers of global change (e.g. 
economic growth) or of global change itself (e.g. climate-change-induced mortality). Also in 
other respects, the current generation of demographic models leave much to be desired. The 
first chapter of the review by the US National Research Council (Bongaerts and Bulatao, 
2000, p. 30) makes for a chilling read. “Recent projections [are] made without a firm 
theoretical basis. The general assumption is that future […] trends will follow trajectories 
similar to thos in the past […] derived informally from an understanding of past trends.” 
Sanderson (1998) calls the standard models “non-causal”, and shows how adding correlates of 
fertility and mortality increases the predictive abilities of demographic models. 
In this paper, we present a population model that is simple enough to be adopted in most 
integrated assessment models of global change, and that generates sufficient statistics on 
population. Our model can reproduce some of the results of other projections, although we 
need to push parameter values beyond credibility to do so. The model responds to economic 
growth and to global change. 
We use per capita income as the main driver of demographic change. Other researchers have 
advocated such things as education, labour participation and medical care. However, these 
matters are closely correlated to per capita income. Moreover, projections of per capita 
income are widely available, while projections of education and health care are not. 
The paper is set-up as follows. Section 2 describes model and data. It also compares the four 
main processes of CHIMP (fertility, mortality, AIDS, migration) to other demographic 
models used in this field. Section 3 shows results and sensitivity analyses. Section 4 discusses 
fertility, the single most important process for long-term projections. Sections 3 and 4 also 
compare CHIMP results to those of other demographic models. Section 5 shows scenario 
analyses for global change. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The  model 
This section describes version 1.0 of the Canberra-Hamburg Integrated Model of Population 
(CHIMP). CHIMP draws on the population module of ABARE’s Global Trade and 
Environment Model (GTEM; Pant, 2002) for fertility and mortality, but modifies the 
convergent properties of fertility, modifies mortality to include AIDS, and adds migration. We 
discuss functional form and parameters, distinguishing between the standard functions and 
best guess parameter values (which together form the “base case”) and alternative functions 
and values (which are used in sensitivity analyses). 
 
2.1. Population  cohorts 
The core of the population model is the age/sex cohort structure. We distinguish 17 (NA=16) 
age-cohorts of 0-4. 5-9, …, 75-79, and 80+. We distinguish two sexes, male and female. The 
time step of the model is equal to the age-cohort, namely 5 years. The size C of an age/sex 
cohort in region r of sex s and age a at time t follows from: 
(1)    ,,, ,, 1 , 1 ,, 1 , 1 (1 ) , , , 1,2,..., 1 rsat rsa t rsa t CC M r s t a N A −− −− =− ∀ = −where M is the mortality rate, specified below. That is, in each period, people either die or 
promote to a higher age cohort. People do not change sex. The size of the youngest cohort 
(a=0) is specified below. The size of the oldest cohort follows from: 
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That is, people above 80 years of age either die or remain in their age cohort. The total 
population P of region r at time t follows from: 








Statistics such as the share of people under 15 or above 65 and the dependency ratio are 
readily computed. 
Data for age/sex cohorts and fertility and mortality rates for 1997 are taken from the 
International Data Base (IDB) of the U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs Center 
(version May 2000). Data for mortality rates are taken from United Nations, Demographic 
Yearbook (Historical Supplement, March 2000) except for Bangladesh and India (WHO 
South East Asia Regional Office) and China (Clinical Trial Service Unit & Epidemiological 
Studies Unit, Oxford University, UK). The IDB is the most comprehensive international 
database. However, many small countries are excluded from the database, while for other 
countries the most recent entries date back to the 1960s or even 1950s. The same is true for 
the Demographic Yearbook. Observations from before 1987 were excluded. Missing 
observations were replaced by regional averages.  
 
2.2. Fertility 
The size of the first cohort is given by: 
(4)   
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where G is the share of boys or girls within the newborns, assumed to be constant over time, 
and F denotes fertility. That is, only women of age 15-49 have children. The fertility rate is 
age-dependent. 
Fertility rates for the base year (1997) are as observed. Fertility rates for later periods are 
perturbed with the change in per capita income. Fertility follows 
(5a) 
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where y is per capita income, g denotes income group (y<$540/person/year, 
$540/p/yr<y<$7,000/p/yr, y>$7,000/p/yr), and η is the income elasticity at the median income 
listed in Table 1. IC is the indicator function, nought if C is false, unity otherwise; αg is a rate 
of convergence parameter that equals 0.05; multiplied with the indicator function, this implies 
convergence for high income regions and no convergence for other regions. Fconv,a is the age-
specific equilibrium fertility; it is specified to add up to 1.6 (the convergent total fertility rate) 
while the age-profile equals the average age-profile of the countries in the highest income 
group. W is a weight specified as 














 where ŷ denotes the median per capita income per group, β=2.314 is a smoothing parameter 
and W*r, t is defined such that  .  ,, 1, rgt
g
Wr =∀ ∑ t
Equation (5a) was estimated separately for each income group using panel data analysis. 
Equation (5b) represents a kernel smoothing process to make continuous the transition of one 
income group to the next. 
The interpretation of (5) is that the income elasticity of fertility is a weighted average of the 
income elasticity of three reference groups. The income elasticity for high income regions is 
zero; their fertilities evolve only through convergence to an exogenously specified profile. 
Total fertility at convergence is below replacement fertility (2.1 children per woman) in the 
base case; that is, population asymptotically goes to zero. The distribution of convergent 
fertility over the age groups equals the average distribution of the high income countries (see 
Table 1). 
The above specification implies that fertility necessarily declines with economic growth 
except for the richest region. This is indeed what is generally observed, but in some poor 
countries, particularly China, fertility is artificially suppressed. According to Equation (5), 
fertility would fall even further as incomes rise. Equation (4) is therefore not applied to China 
as long as its income is below $7000 per person per year. 
Note that CHIMP deviates substantially from other demographic models. Lutz et al. (2004), 
for instance, assume future total fertility rates based on what seems trend extrapolation. The 
UN projections are based on expert judgement on the rate of decline and convergent total 
fertility (Bongaerts and Bulatoa, 2000, p. 63-64). The World Bank and US Census Bureau 
projections are based on autoregressive techniques (Bongaerts and Bulateo, p. 64). In contrast, 
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where W is the same kernel smoothing weight as defined in (5b), y is per capita income, g 
income group, ε is the income elasticity at the median income listed in Table 2, τ is the rate of 
technological progress, and IC is the indicator function, nought if C is false, unity otherwise. 
Note that life expectancy is projected to continue to increase with economic growth. Note also 
that medical technology is assumed to primarily benefit the rich. 
Mortality is updated by assuming that all age-cohorts have the same proportional change in 
mortality rates, and hence by numerically solving 
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where LE is life expectancy, M is mortality, and g
LE is the region-, sex- and time-specific 
growth rate of life expectancy, and g
M is the growth rate of mortality; g
LE is implied by (6); 
we numerically solve (7) for g
M.
2 The first part of (7) gives the definition of life expectancy, 
which is the ratio of the total number of people in a population over the number of people 
 
2 Note that we deviate from the original GTEM population model, which uses an analytical approximation of (7) 
and solves that numerically (see Pant, 2002); here we solve (7) numerically. aged zero, under the assumptions that mortality rates and the absolute number of newborns 
are constant. 
Note that CHIMP again deviates from other demographic models. Lutz et al. (2004), for 
instance, assume future life expectancy.  The UN population projections are also based on 
expert judgement, including an assumed maximum life expectancy (Bongaerts and Bulatao, 
2000, p. 129). The World Bank and US Census Bureau population projections use fitted 
logistic functions, with an assumed maximum life expectancy (Bongaerts and Bulatao, 2000, 
p. 129-130). In contrast, we model life expectancy based on two crucial parameters: income 
elasticity and technical progress. 
 
2.4. Migration 
An essential part of the migration model is the relationship between the international 
migration rate and variables that are generated within the population model or provided 
exogenously to it. Thus, achieving reliable estimates for the impacts of differences in GDP 
per capita (y) and GDP per capita growth rates as well as estimates for the influence of the 
age structure of the source country and the destination country, are of particular interest. 
Following Massey et al. (1993), theories on international migration based on neoclassical 
macroeconomics would suggest to include especially differences in wage rates and 
characteristics of the labour market together with government controls on migration of labor 
flows. Differences in GDP per capita can be seen as a rough proxy for wage differentials. The 
unemployment rate is the only information regarding the labor market that can be obtained for 
a broad base of countries in a relatively consistent way that can be used in estimation. 
Network theory, predicting the perpetuation of international movement due to sets of 
interpersonal ties that connect migrants with former migrants put forward to include lags of 
the dependent variable. Finally, the distance between the capital cities can be seen as an 
approximation of the individual costs of migration, where costs not only refer to the expenses 
on traveling but also to the problems of barriers between cultures.    
Data on migration rates are scarce, as most countries provide data only on net migration. The 
Migration Policy Institute
3 (MPI) offers numbers of immigrants into the USA, Canada, 
Australia, The Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom segmented by the source 
country, for the years 1990 to 1999. These data are converted into migration rates, using 
population numbers of the International Data Base (IDB) of the U.S. Census Bureau, 
International Programs Center (version May 2000). Data for GDP per capita and 
unemployment are taken from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 
2002).  
We estimate the migration to the above-mentioned regions
4 separately. We tested a variety of 
functional forms, different variables concerning the age structure of the country that the 
people are leaving and several combinations of dummies for the emigration regions. 
Surprisingly, the unemployment rates in the destination country/region as well as in the 
source country are not significant. The following panel-regression was estimated for the 
different regions: 
(8) 
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where EMR is the emigration rate, that is, the number of migrants from country j to country i 
divided by the population of country j; dy denotes the growth rate in per capita income in the 
                                                 
3 http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/ 
4 The Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom are used together, representing "Western Europe". source country, DY the difference in per capita income between the source country and the 
destination country;
5 dy and DY together measure the expected improvement of living 
standard by emigrating; S
0_9 is the share of the population of age less than ten years in the 
source country; FSU is a dummy that is equal to one, if the source country is part of the 
former Soviet Union; t indexes time, and u is white noise. We expect a fairly high persistence 
in migration patterns. If the income difference is high, migration would be high too; but if 
economic growth in the source country is high, migration would be low. The expected sign on 
the number of young children is unknown; on the one hand, a family with young children has 
a greater incentive to migrate; on the other hand, children make migration more cumbersome. 
In addition to the four regressions, we put all destination regions together into one panel; that 
is, we estimate the emigration rate, without specifying the destination country. We use this to 
estimate migration to destinations for which we do not have specific data. Furthermore, we 
use the results of this additional regression to make the region-specific estimates more reliable 
by constructing a weighted estimate (Theil and Goldberger, 1961): 
(9a)   
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where c denotes country and g denotes the global average. The regression results are in the 
appendix. 
The fit is fairly good in all regressions. This is due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable, as migration rates are persistent. Furthermore, in the "world-regression", distance 
and the difference in per capita income have the expected negative and positive influence, 
respectively. The economic growth rate in the source country has the expected negative effect, 
as potential migrants compare their expected future income in the destination and source 
country. Countries with a higher share of young children (under 10 years of age) generate 
fewer migrants, as migration is more expensive and more disruptive for families with young 
children. 
Above, we estimate how migration between selected countries evolves. To initialize the 
model, we need migration rates for all countries. We estimated these as follows. The 
evolution of migration rates follows from Equation (8), but is conditional on the starting point 
(1990 in our case). We estimate the 1990 migration rates so as to reproduce observed net 
migration rates
6 in 1997 as closely as possible, minimizing the squared deviation of observed 
and predicted net migration rates.
7 The minimization is forced to reproduce some known 
flows of migrants.
8 The 1997 migration rates follow readily. 
                                                 
5 Note that we assume that there is net migration from poor to rich regions only; DY is therefore always positive. 
6 The net migration rates are derived from the difference between the population at time t and the population of 
the previous period augmented by the number of new born and reduced by the number of deaths according to the 
fertility and mortality rates in the following way:  
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where nmt denotes the net migration rate  at time t, Pt is total population, Ft is overall fertility and Mt is overall 
mortality. 
7 We used the following procedure to derive a starting value for the 1990 estimates. First, migration rates in 1991 
are assumed to be in a steady state thus following directly from Equation (8) (using the "world" parameter 
estimates). Estimates for the years 1992-1997 readily follow. Second, we fitted a linear trend to the country-
specific migration rate for 1991-1997, and derived the 1990 value. 
8 More than 150000 people move from Mexico to the United States, which is not adequately projected by the 
estimation process; only some 20000 people migrate between Canada and the United States; the number of The obtained initial migration rates evolve from period to period according to changes of 
values in three of the independent variables of the regressions, that change over time within 
the model, namely the change in GDP per capita growth, in difference in GDP per capita 
between the emigration country and the destination country and in the share of people less 
than ten years old. Using the regression estimates of the log-linear formulation of the model, 
emigration rates change via: 
(10) 
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Note that there is not a one-to-one match between Equations (8) and (10). Equation (10) omits 
those factors of Equation (8) that do not change. Equation (10) also omits the autoregressive 
parameter (i.e., it is set to zero), which was included for estimation purposes only.
9 Strictly, a 
further multiplicator ( )
0.95
,, 1 ,, 2 ijt ijt EMR EMR −−  should be added to the right-hand side of (10) 
(for a one-year time step). However, this term would dominate and would drive the 
emigration rate from i to j to zero, and from j to i to unity. This is hard to justify, but the 
results are reported below as a sensitivity analysis. Note that (10), in combination with the 
income scenarios, has a decline in migration as income gaps narrow and economic growth 
slows. However, the decline in the share of young children at first increases net migration 
from poorer to richer regions. 
The computed emigration rates are related to the total population. However, there is a specific 
age pattern of migrants. For instance, following MPI statistics, people in their late 20s are 
most likely to migrate. Table 3, which is constructed using the MPI data, shows the 
percentage of each cohort within the total number of immigrants for certain regions. A few 
adjustments with respect to the age groups used in the model were necessary and the values 
for ROW are simply averages. So, after the absolute number of migrants is computed, the 
change of the cohorts in the emigration and the immigration region is calculated with the 
shares of this table. It is assumed that the shares do not change over time. 
Once more, CHIMP deviates from other demographic models. Lutz et al. (2004) assume 
absolute migration numbers that are constant over time. The UN and US Census Bureau 
population projections hold some migration at their current absolute levels, and let other 
migration converge to zero. The grouping of countries and the rate of convergence is based on 
expert judgement (Bongaerts and Bulatao, 2000, p. 174.) The World Bank population 
projections have migration converge to zero in a few decades (Bongaerts and Bulatao, 2000, 




The HIV model works with the following equation: 
(11) 
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where HIV denotes the number of HIV-infected people, and dHIV the change in that number, 
Y denotes national income, measured in US dollar; φ is technological progress and 
 
immigrants to the USA and Canada must exceed 650000 respectively 1800000 people, which have been lower 
bound values during the late 1990s according to MPI; the number of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
is limited to 1 million people (otherwise the flow of migrants would be overstated, because of the geographical 
proximity and large difference in per capita income). 
9 Recall that including a lagged dependent variable is equivalent to including an AR(1) error structure. behavioural change (e.g., abstinence, faithfulness, condom use). This model was estimated 
with OLS using data for 1999; there are not enough data for more appropriate panel data 
analysis. Equation (11) has that HIV is highly persistent, in fact explosive, but falls as income 
rises and technology progresses. 
The number of AIDS deaths follows from: 
(12)    ( ) ( 10) AIDS t dHIV t =−
as suggested by REFS.
10 The number of HIV cases follows from 
(13)    ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) HIV t HIV t dHIV t AIDS t = − +− −−
Starting values are in Table 4. 
After the number of AIDS deaths is computed, the deaths are divided into age and sex groups 
using data for the USA from the HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, Vol.14 
(http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hasr1402.htm) and data for Sub-Saharan Africa from REF. In 
the US, men are much more likely to be infected than woman. The age profile for other 
countries is derived from a linear interpolation using per capita income as a scalar. 
CHIMP again deviates from other demographic models. Lutz et al. (2004), for instance, 
include AIDS by downward adjustment of life expectancy, based on what appear to be ad hoc 





Figure 1 shows total population sizes for the 16 regions for the coming 200 years. Table 6 has 
some of the main characteristics. In the base case, the population peaks at 13.2 billion people 
around 2170 and falls to 13.0 billion people by 2200. Subsaharan Africa overtakes South Asia 
as the most populous region around 2070. In the next section, we compare the CHIMP 
projections to those of other demographic models. The crucial difference is our assumptions 
on fertility. We first discuss other sensitivities. 
Above, the sex ratio of new-born children is kept as in 1997. If we let it converge to 0.5 in 
2200, the peak population rise to 13.4 billion people and the 2200 population to 13.3 billion 
people. The 2200 population is 2.6% greater than in the base case. This is because, in the base 
scenario, there are more baby boys than baby girls. The effect is strongest in China and South 
Asia, where the 2200 population is 6.1% and 5.0% higher than in the base scenario. See 
Figure 1. 
Without migration, the 2200 world population would be 13.5 billion people, 4.0% higher than 
the base case, because would-be migrants do not adopt the fertility and mortality of their 
would-be destination countries. This global aggregate hides large regional changes, however. 
The 2200 population of Western Europe would be 88.6% lower, while the population of 
North Africa would 186.2% higher. See Figure 1 and Table 6. We also investigate a case in 
which the migration rate increases by the ratio of the emigration rate in the previous period 
and the rate in the period before that, raised to the power 0.76, which corresponds to an 
annual auto-regressive parameter of 0.95; see Equation (10). In this high migration case, the 
2200 population falls by 0.5% compared to the base scenario. Again the regional differences 
                                                 
10 Note that we could also introduce technological progress in (12). However, separate dynamics of HIV and 
AIDS would not influence the dynamics of the total population, our prime interest in this paper. are stark. The 2200 population of the Japan increases by 88.4%, while the 2200 population of 
North Africa falls by 37.5%. See Figure 1. 
Without AIDS, the 2200 world population would be 13.8 billion, 6.7% higher than in the base 
case. The 2200 Sub-Saharan Africa would be 12.9% higher, while the population of Western 
Europe would be 4.5% higher, largely the result of higher immigration. See Figure 2 and 
Table 6. Without technological progress in combating AIDS, the 2200 world population 
would 12.6 billion people, 3.2% lower than the base case; again, the effect is largely felt in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where the 2200 population would be 5.8% lower. See Figure 2. 
In the base scenario, the life expectancy increases by 20 years in the 21
st century for Japanese 
men and by 23 years for Japanese women. Lutz et al. (2004) assume an increase by 21 years 
for both. In Sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy increases by 5 year for men and by 6 years 
for women. Lutz et al. (2004) assume 19 and 21 years, respectively. The difference is 
explained by the fact that we assume that technological progress in medicine primarily 
benefits the rich, while the health status of the poor would improve through economic growth. 
If we assume that the middle income group would benefit from technological progress at the 
half the rate the rich do, the life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa would increase by  8 years 
for men and by 14 years for women. The 2200 world population would be 19.0% higher, the 
population in Sub-Saharan Africa 30.4%. See Figure 2 and Table 6. Without technological 
progress, life expectancy in the rich countries would hardly change, while life expectancy 
would increase by almost as much as in the base scenario until 2100, but slower afterwards. 
The 2200 world population would be 11.2% lower, the US population 40.5%. See Figure 2 
and Table 6. 
Figure 3 shows the fraction of people of 75 years and older for selected regions for the base 
scenario. This fraction increases continuously everywhere for the next 200 years. By the end 
of the 22
nd century, more than half of all Chinese is over 75 years of age, a situation that is 
hard to imagine. Figure 3 also shows the dependency ratio. For the OECD regions, this rises 
continuously. For the other regions, the dependency ratio first falls. In the case of the former 
Soviet Union, this has to do with the high mortality of the elderly. For the other regions, the 
dependency ratio falls with falling fertility, before rising with ageing. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the dependency ratio only starts rising in the 2
nd half of the 22
nd century. The dependence ratio 
exceeds 65% in China in 2200.  
 
 
4.  The importance of fertility 
Of all the uncertainties around future population – migration, mortality, AIDS – the 
uncertainty around the evolution of fertility is the most important. In this section, we present a 
sensitivity analysis around the formulation of fertility in CHIMP. 
 
4.1. Alternative  convergence  points 
Above, we assume that fertility eventually converges to replacement level for all regions. 
Figure 4 displays population sizes for the alternative convergent total fertility rates of 1.1 and 
2.1 (replacement). Until around 2075, the convergent behaviour of fertility has little influence. 
After that, it becomes very important. The population in 2200 is 10.1 billion for an eventual 
total fertility rate of 1.1, and 16.0 billion for 2.1, 16.9% below and 23.1% above the base case, 
respectively. The population of the currently high and middle income countries are more 
affected by the assumption on the convergent total fertility rate than are the currently low 
income countries, because the former are closer to convergence than the latter. Obviously, the problems of an aging society and a growing dependency rate are less (more) pronounced the 
higher (lower) the convergent fertility. 
 
4.2. Income  elasticities 
Figure 4 also shows what happens if we multiply the income elasticities of fertility by 1.5 and 
2.0. With 50% higher elasticities, the 2200 world population would be 7.1 billion people, 
down from a peak of 9.9 billion people; this is 45.5% and 24.8% lower than in the base case; 
the population peak is much earlier, around 2090 rather than around 2170. With 100% higher 
elasticities, the world population peaks around 2050 at 8.8 billion people, and falls to 4.7 
billion in 2200, 73.4% below the base case. The poor regions are most affected by this, 
particularly South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. With the (very) high elasticities, their 2200 
populations are 33.1% (12.1%) and 36.1% (14.1%) of their 2200 populations in the base case. 
See Table 9. 
Table 7 compares our population projections with selected other studies. Table 7 shows that, 
in order to reproduce Lutz et al. (2004), we would need to double our estimates of the income 
elasticity of fertility. In that case, both we and Lutz et al. project a world population of 8.8 
billion people in 2050, while we project a population of 8.2 billion in 2100 against 8.4 billion 
by Lutz et al. Although income elasticities are hard to estimate, doubling them seems 
unjustified. 
 
4.3. Alternative  income  elasticities 
In the base specification, the income elasticity of fertility is the weighted sum of the 
elasticities at median income for low, high and middle income regions. The result is that the 
income elasticity falls as countries grow richer. Eventually, the income elasticity goes to zero 
and fertility reaches its convergence point. 
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The convergence process is the same as above. The parameters for Equation (15) were 
estimated with OLS for 1997 data with 148 observations.
11 Table 8 shows the results. 
Interestingly, the income elasticities of fertility for low and high age groups fall if income 
grows (implying that fertility falls ever faster), while the income elasticity of fertility rise with 
income for middle ages (implying that fertility falls ever slower). 
Figure 5 shows the resulting population sizes if fertility follows Equation (15)
12 and if fertility 
follows Equation (15) without the drift term. With the drift term, the 2200 world population is 
10.9 billion people, 15.9% below the base case. North Africa is most affected; its 2200 
population falls by 22.3% compared to the base case. Without the drift term, the 2200 world 
population is 8.3 billion people, 35.9% below the base case. China is most affected, its 2200 
population falls by 80.7% compared to the base case; for Japan and South Korea, the drop is 
                                                 
11 We estimated income elasticities of the form κ+λy as well as κy
λ, but the latter could not be reliably estimated. 
12 Again, China follows the drift term from 1997 onwards. 52.6%. Table 7 shows that, although the world population is less, it does not come near the 
projection of Lutz et al. (2004). See also Table 9. 
 
4.4. Equilibrium  fertility 
The fertility models above take observed fertility as a starting point, perturb it with changes in 
age structure and per capita income, and then gradually let it converge to an equilibrium point. 
In the alternative presented here, we omit the second step, letting fertility converge to an 
equilibrium value, which is itself changing with age structure and per capita income. 
(16a)    ,,, ,,,1 ,,, (1 )
N
rfa t rfa t rfa t FF ρρ − =− +F
where 
(16b)  { } ,,, , , max ,
N
r f a t r t conv a Fy
β α = F  
where Fconv,a is as above; α and β are parameters, obtained from one cross-sectional 
regression for each age group, using 1997 data of 148 countries; the values for α and β are 
given in Table 8; ρ is also a parameter, measuring the convergence from observed to “natural” 
fertility; ρ is set to 0.03 to roughly reproduce the base model. 
Figure 5 shows the resulting population sizes if fertility follows Equation (16). The 2200 
world population would be 10.5 billion people, 29.0% below the base case. The effect is 
largest in China, where population falls by 61.6%. Without the cap on fertility, the global and 
regional results would be very similar. Table 7 shows that this configuration of CHIMP does 
not bring it closer to Lutz et al. (2004); in fact, the deviation from the baseline comes only 
after 2100. If we set ρ= 0.06, 2200 world population would be 2.2 billion people, 82.7% 
below the base case. The effect would be largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a drop in 2200 
population of 88.3% . With rapid convergence to “natural” fertility, the CHIMP population 
projections fall below those of Lutz et al.; see Table 7 and Table 9. 
 
5.  Global change scenarios 
Above, we use the FUND scenario of economic growth, which is close to the IS92a scenario 
developed in the context of the IPCC. More recent IPCC work generated the SRES scenarios. 
The SRES population scenarios were developed independently from the SRES economic 
scenarios. Here, we investigate what population scenarios are consistent with the SRES 
economic scenarios. 
Figure 6 shows the resulting population sizes for the base model and the four basic SRES 
scenarios of per capita income according to the IMAGE model. In the A1 scenario, the 2200 
world population would be 9.3 billion people, 18.0% below the IS92a scenario. The regional 
distribution would be very different, with the Middle East having 35.8% more people and 
North Africa 56.7% less. In the A2 scenario, the 2200 population would be 14.9 billion 
people, 15.3% higher than in IS92a. The regional pattern is again very different, with Sub-
Saharan Africa seeing an increase of 41.1% and South Asia a decrease of 11.2%. In the B1 
scenario, the 2200 population would be 10.1 billion people, 11.9% below IS92a. Eastern 
Europe would see its 2200 population increase by 22.1%, South Asia a decrease of 38.6%. In 
the B2 scenario, the 2200 population would be 12.6 billion people, 2.8% below IS92a. 
However, under IS92a, the world population is falling in 2200 whereas, under SRES B2, it is 
still rising. Sub-Saharan Africa would see its population rise by 10.4%, South Asia fall by 
32.0%. Table 10 shows more detailed results, and includes the SRES projections according to 
IMAGE as well. In both cases, A2 is the most populous scenario, followed by B2. A1 and B1 
are close together, with A1 more populous according to IMAGE, and B1 according to 
CHIMP. Note that CHIMP has a much narrower range of results as only per capita income 
differs, while the SRES storylines indicate that other parameters should change as well. 
Population is a major driver of global change, but global change may also affect population. 
One example is through the impact of climate change on human health. We here consider 
malaria only, which is a major disease that is sensitive to climate change. In contrast to 
cardiovascular and respiratory disorders, which affect the elderly, malaria mainly affects the 
young and potentially productive. 
We use the health module of FUND to generate a scenario of climate-change-induced malaria 
mortality for the same population, economic, and emissions scenario as in our base case here. 
In order to better demonstrate the effects, we assume a high sensitivity of malaria to climate 
change (a 1°C global warming leads to a 14% increase in malaria), and a low income 
elasticity of malaria (a 1% increase in GDP per capita leads to a 2% decrease in malaria 
mortality); see Link and Tol (2004) for the model and its parameters. We assume that all 
malaria mortality is under-five mortality. We add climate-change-induced malaria to baseline 
mortality in CHIMP. 
Figure 6 shows the results for Sub-Saharan Africa, the most vulnerable region. The fraction of 
people dying of climate-change-induced malaria is small. This is because in the first half of 
the century, climate change is modest, while in the second half of the century, people in 
Africa are sufficiently rich to protect against this infectious disease (Tol and Dowlatabadi, 
2001). Qualitatively, the pattern of malaria deaths on the one hand and the pattern of 
population change on the other hand are very different. The latter is also not just the integral 
of the former, because of the indirect effects of changes in mortality. Particularly, even as 
climate-change-induced malaria goes to zero, the scenarios with and without climate change 
continue to diverge. This is due to the fact that there are less parents around to have children. 
 
 
6. Discussion  and  conclusion 
We present a new model for making long term projections of the world population. The 
model has several crucial features: (1) it is freely available; (2) it responds to economic 
growth and climate change; and (3) many of its parameters are estimated from data. Other 
models are hidden, non-responsive, and based on expert guesses. 
The long term population projections and sensitivity analyses reveal a number of things. 
Some conclusions were known before. The growth of the world population is likely to slow, 
and the number of people may start to fall in the future. The average population will get older 
and older. In other respects, our results differ substantially from previous work. 
We can reproduce previous results on total population numbers, but we need to force the 
model hard. Fertility is the variable that is most important for the future number of people. 
The rate at which fertility falls determines whether the world population will peak at 8 billion 
people (as other studies contend) or at 12 billion people (as our results indicate). In order to 
have our population peak at 8 billion, we need to let fertility fall twice as fast as the empirical 
evidence suggests. 
However, as we force our model reproduce the total number of people from other studies, we 
cannot simultaneously reproduce other parameters, such as longevity. The reason for this is 
that, in our model, these variables are not independent. The sensitivity analysis show that, although long-term equilibrium fertility is the main driver of the eventual population size, the 
rate of fertility change is at least as important for the population of the 21
st century. 
On integration, the results presented here clearly show that the IPCC was wrong to make 
population independent of income. Projecting population independently of economic growth 
is inappropriate in principle and may lead to substantial errors in practice. Projecting 
population independently of climate change is wrong in principle, but the bias is minimal. 
When starting this project, our prime aim was to develop a population model that would fit in 
our integrated assessment frameworks. The model was primarily intended for our own use, 
but as we are civil servants on public money, the model would be available to others as well. 
Building the model to the best of our knowledge and ability, we found that our projections 
differ from those of other researchers, and we stumbled on the many questionable 
assumptions that have to be made in population projections. The divergence of the 
projections, and their sensitivity to reasonable variations in parameters and assumptions 
demonstrate how little we know. Although we do not claim that our projections are “more 
right” than those of other researchers, our projections are not obviously “more wrong” either. 
The sizeable uncertainty about such a fundamental driver of global change requires 
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Washington, D.C.Table 1. Income elasticities of birth rates at the median annual income. 
Age Low Middle High  Conv. Fert.
15-19 -0.5127  -0.2162  0.0000 0.0196
20-24 -0.2749  -0.2060  0.0000  0.0809 
25-29 -0.1730  -0.1545  0.0000  0.1438 
30-34 -0.1703  -0.2271  0.0000  0.1168 
35-39 -0.2506  -0.3534  0.0000  0.0479 
40-44 -0.4912  -0.5652  0.0000  0.0101 
45-49 -0.8190  -0.6820  0.0000  0.0008 
Med. Inc.  $315  $1414  $20843   
 Table 2: Income elasticities of life expectancy. 
Gender Low  Middle  High 
Male 0.1400  0.0754  0.0120
Female 0.1418  0.0848  0.0233 
 Table 3. Age and sex profile of immigrants (percent of total immigrants). 
   USA  CAN  WEU  ANZ  FSU  ROW 
   male  female  male  female  male  female male female male female  male  female 
0-4 2.33 2.67  2.67 2.92 3.83 3.84 4.92 4.64 3.22 3.05 3.39 3.42
5-9 3.28 3.14  3.77 3.43 3.27 3.06 4.18 4.02 3.81 3.56 3.66 3.44
10-14 4.66 4.36  5.35 4.77 2.82 2.55 3.71 3.59 3.32 3.11 3.97 3.68
15-19 5.28 5.12  3.10 3.75 3.36 4.08 3.22 3.68 3.87 4.03 3.76 4.13
20-24 4.16 5.23  3.78 4.32 5.82 8.13 3.51 5.51 6.48 6.42 4.75 5.92
25-29 5.66 7.24  7.60 7.91 10.02 9.43 6.34 8.02 7.21 5.76 7.37 7.67
30-34 5.29 6.30  7.11 6.88 7.90 6.30 6.74 7.20 6.24 4.90 6.65 6.32
35-39 3.75 4.70  5.04 5.13 5.19 4.02 5.06 5.22 5.00 4.00 4.81 4.61
40-44 2.79 3.71  3.74 4.05 3.24 2.44 3.31 3.35 3.56 3.01 3.33 3.31
45-49 2.22 2.88  1.92 1.87 1.94 1.55 2.22 2.06 2.49 2.35 2.16 2.14
50-54 1.64 2.22  1.42 1.44 1.24 1.02 1.28 1.32 1.33 1.37 1.38 1.47
55-59 1.39 2.03  1.20 1.32 0.70 0.70 0.94 1.20 1.67 2.29 1.18 1.51
60-64 1.22 1.70  1.05 1.11 0.45 0.61 0.92 1.02 1.06 1.41 0.94 1.17
65-69 1.01 1.29  0.56 0.74 0.52 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.88 1.52 0.72 0.96
70-74 0.59 0.79  0.33 0.45 0.27 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.43 1.00 0.40 0.61
75-79 0.29 0.37  0.26 0.22 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.54 0.21 0.30
80+ 0.30 0.40  0.37 0.38 0.10 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.75 0.23 0.40
 Table 4. Number (thousands) of people with HIV, people with newly acquired HIV and 











USA  820.0 38.2 28.0 12.5
CAN  44.0 2.8 0.7 0.3
WEU 474.7  29.8  159.7  7.7
JPK  9.9 1.6 0.4 0.8
ANZ  12.3 1.6 0.7 0.1
EEU  31.2 2.0 1.9 1.9
FSU  208.2 12.1  0.9 50.0
MDE  86.8  16.7 0.2 1.4
CAM  293.2  151.0 21.5 19.3
LAM  1002.5 37.1 60.5 24.0
SAS  4293.5 47.7  149.7 32.0
SEA  1591.7 202.7 104.8  93.0
CHI  411.5 49.8  4.2 36.0
MAF  21.6 4.1 1.9 2.2
SSA  22333.5 3794.3 2008.3 2400.0
SIS  405.1 63.4 24.7 61.0




 male  Female  male  female 
0-4 0.0243  0.0452 0.0017 0.0005
5-9 0.0021  0.0049 0.0017 0.0005
10-14 0.0020  0.0027 0.0017 0.0005
15-19 0.0112  0.0344 0.0140 0.0044
20-24 0.0599  0.1067 0.0140 0.0044
25-29 0.1060  0.1009 0.1115 0.0351
30-34 0.1026  0.0839 0.1115 0.0351
35-39 0.0776  0.0519 0.1555 0.0489
40-44 0.0508  0.0299 0.1555 0.0489
45-49 0.0296  0.0214 0.0705 0.0222
50-54 0.0169  0.0107 0.0705 0.0222
55-59 0.0089  0.0035 0.0197 0.0062
60-64 0.0090  0.0042 0.0197 0.0062
65-69 0.0000  0.0000 0.0132 0.0042
70-74 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
75-79 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
80+ 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 
a 529/capita 
b $28,662/capita  Table 6. Maximum and final population sizes (millions) in the base scenario for the 16 
regions, and the ratio of maximum and final population size in the alternative cases to the 
bases case.  
  base  no migr. no   AIDS no   tech.  broad tech. 
 2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200
USA 460 660 0.645 0.346 1.008 1.020 0.824 0.595 1.008 1.042
CAN 55 79 0.448 0.192 1.007 1.019 0.826 0.606 1.012 1.057
WEU 773 1286 0.334 0.114 1.019 1.045 0.851 0.668 1.021 1.103
JPK 266 349 0.472 0.203 1.003 1.012 0.814 0.606 1.015 1.059
ANZ 33 40 0.694 0.399 1.007 1.025 0.824 0.620 1.008 1.055
EEU 77 118 0.752 0.207 1.021 1.046 0.867 0.673 1.033 1.119
FSU 265 310 0.491 0.149 1.011 1.031 0.910 0.686 1.121 1.228
MEA 613 613 1.032 1.126 1.006 1.022 0.951 0.711 1.062 1.156
CAM 318 279 1.320 1.963 1.011 1.017 0.897 0.667 1.041 1.052
LAM 600 570 1.114 1.207 1.010 1.016 0.851 0.570 1.023 1.041
SAS 2390 1277 1.265 1.819 1.010 1.016 1.000 0.801 1.062 1.184
SEA 1018 868 1.005 1.033 1.011 1.015 0.941 0.696 1.070 1.089
CHI 1177 670 1.206 1.561 1.002 1.006 0.950 0.717 1.059 1.096
NAF 267 181 1.608 2.862 1.005 1.024 0.964 0.745 1.060 1.083
SSA 3441 5365 1.029 1.150 1.126 1.129 0.999 0.927 1.043 1.304
SIS 192 295 0.360 0.172 1.036 1.058 0.966 0.751 1.062 1.133
World 11947 12960 1.016 1.040 1.043 1.067 0.951 0.788 1.049 1.190
 
 Table 7. World population (in million people) according to various studies and various 
configurations of CHIMP. 
Study 2050  2100
IIASA 8,797  8,414
UN 8,919  -
WB 8,806  -
USCB 9,084  -
This study, base case  9,546  11,947
This study, low convergence  9,508  11,661
This study, high convergence  9,585  12,258
This study, high elasticities  9,146  9,873
This study, very high elasticities  8,792  8,238
This study, alternative elasticities  9,521  11,613
This study, alternative elasticities, no convergence  9,281  10,669
This study, natural fertility  9,529  11,828
This study, natural fertility, fast convergence  8,724  7,881Table 8. Parameters for Equations (15) and (16), and their goodness-of-fit. 
Age  κ  λ  Radj
2  α  β  Radj
2
15-19 -0.2751 -3.27  10
-6 0.53 1.2763 -0.4455 0.50
20-24 -0.2261 -1.31  10
-6 0.52 1.2691 -0.2944 0.51
25-29  -0.2144   7.78 10
-7 0.36 0.6091 -0.1739 0.36
30-34  -0.2806   2.03 10
-6 0.24 0.4634 -0.1751 0.22
35-39  -0.3838   1.81 10
-6 0.28 0.5856 -0.2894 0.27
40-44  -0.5160   6.07 10
-7 0.38 0.8764 -0.4884 0.38
45-49 -0.7748 -8.28  10
-7 0.38 1.5264 -0.8163 0.38
 Table 9. 2100 and 220 population sizes (millions) in the base scenario for the 16 regions, and 
the ratio of maximum and final population size in the alternative cases to the base case. 
  base  high elas.  v. high elas.  alt.elas.  Nat. fert. fast 
 2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200
USA 460 660 0.976 0.866 0.957 0.782 0.991 0.941 0.634 0.205
CAN 55 79 0.963 0.825 0.933 0.723 0.993 0.945 0.668 0.242
WEU 773 1286 0.933 0.706 0.880 0.548 0.990 0.918 0.665 0.225
JPK 266 349 0.981 0.886 0.966 0.824 0.999 0.975 0.665 0.239
ANZ 33 40 0.974 0.835 0.954 0.744 0.997 0.958 0.655 0.227
EEU 77 118 0.897 0.677 0.816 0.509 0.973 0.901 0.689 0.219
FSU 265 310 0.861 0.676 0.752 0.498 0.955 0.895 0.771 0.237
MEA 613 613 0.858 0.657 0.743 0.452 0.927 0.820 0.629 0.173
CAM 318 279 0.868 0.732 0.756 0.545 0.909 0.798 0.607 0.134
LAM 600 570 0.940 0.859 0.885 0.751 0.894 0.796 0.566 0.122
SAS 2390 1277 0.730 0.331 0.551 0.121 1.000 0.839 0.793 0.271
SEA 1018 868 0.809 0.600 0.666 0.377 0.937 0.815 0.736 0.227
CHI 1177 670 0.996 0.957 0.992 0.932 1.000 0.990 0.619 0.188
NAF 267 181 0.796 0.542 0.645 0.316 0.935 0.777 0.661 0.160
SSA 3441 5365 0.750 0.361 0.579 0.141 0.977 0.792 0.573 0.117
SIS 192 295 0.823 0.588 0.694 0.384 0.952 0.844 0.748 0.247
World 11947 12960 0.826 0.545 0.704 0.363 0.972 0.841 0.660 0.173
 Table 10. Population sizes (millions) for the 16 regions in 2100 for five alternative economic 
scenario for our projections (CHIMP) and the IPCC projections (IS92a and SRES). 
 IS92a   A1   A2   B1   B2   
  CHIMP IS92a CHIMP SRES CHIMP SRES CHIMP SRES CHIMP SRES 
USA 460 291 448 333 447 450 445 334 440 278
CAN 55 33 53 38 54 52 53 38 52 32
WEU 773 394 715 458 751 619 713 459 713 383
JPK 266 227 265 207 256 279 259 207 254 172
ANZ 33 31 32 28 32 38 32 28 32 23
EEU 77 121 74 94 75 200 77 93 78 110
FSU 265 291 276 226 264 481 279 224 285 264
MEA 613 544 571 202 610 521 574 197 571 364
CAM 318 217 297 215 321 432 310 206 319 341
LAM 600 541 588 536 592 1080 589 514 599 852
SAS 2390 2623 1724 1135 2294 2922 1902 1102 1937 2039
SEA 1018 1062 920 459 1014 1183 932 446 949 826
CHI 1177 1687 1303 1035 1119 2664 1265 1005 1232 1859
NAF 267 408 225 228 267 459 237 219 259 362
SSA 3441 1903 2633 1064 3630 2143 2849 1020 3255 1691
SIS 192 67 172 66 190 133 179 63 188 105










































































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
High migration
Figure 1. Projected population sizes (billion people) for 16 world regions for the period 1997-
2197, for the “base case”, for the case in which the “sex ratio” of new-born children 































































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197










1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
No progress in medicine
 
Figure 2. Projected population sizes (billion people) for 16 world regions for the period 1997-
2197, for the case with “no AIDS”, for the case in with “high AIDS” because of lack of 
technological progress, for the case with “broad progress in medicine” and for the case with 






























Figure 3. The fraction of people over 75 years of age (left panel) and the fraction of people 











































































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
Very high elasticities
 
Figure 4. Projected population sizes for 16 world regions for the period 1997-2197 for the 
case in which the total fertility rate converges to a low level of 1.1 (“low convergence”) , to a 
high level of 2.1 (“high convergence”), for the case in which the income elasticities of fertility 
are 50% higher (“high elasticities) and 100% higher (“very high elasticities) than in the base 


















































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
Alternative elasticities, no convergence
     


































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197










1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
Natural fertility















































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
Natural fertility, fast convergence
Figure 5. Projected population sizes for 16 world regions for the period 1997-2197, for the 
“alternative elasticities” of fertility, with and without convergence to a total fertility rate of 
1.6, and for convergence to “natural fertility” at a rate of 3% per five years and 6% per five 


















































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
A2
     















































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
B1

















































1997 2017 2037 2057 2077 2097 2117 2137 2157 2177 2197
B2
Figure 6. Projected population sizes for 16 world regions for the period 1997-2197 for the 






2002 2027 2052 2077 2102 2127 2152 2177
Change in population
Five-year chance of dieing from climate-change-induced malaria
Figure 7. The effects of climate-change-induced malaria on the population of Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a fraction of the baseline simulation without climate change. The figure also show 
the climate-change-induced malaria mortality per five years. Table A1. 
World              
Number of observations  2481         
Adjusted R2    0.9428         
              
  Coefficient  Std. Error   t-Value       
log(emigr.(t-1)) 0.9476821  0.00536 176.8      
log(distance) -0.0867437  0.015167 -5.72       
gdppc -0.454691  0.194734 -2.33       
diffGDPPC 0.0029703  0.001184 2.51       
share0_9 -0.4273436  0.187164 -2.28       
fsu -0.1134654  0.047501 -2.39       
_cons 0.2416427  0.130064 1.86       
          
         Weighted estimates 
Australia              
Number of observations  1087         
Adjusted R2    0.9034         
  Coefficient  Std. Error   t-Value  CoefficientStd. Error   t-Value 
log(emigr.(t-1)) 0.9013555  0.012103 74.48 0.942628 0.004801 196.354 
log(distance) -0.2403432  0.053994 -4.45 -0.10223 0.014098 -7.2517 
gdppc -0.650616  0.362611 -1.79  -0.52942 0.171357 -3.0896 
diffGDPPC 0.0016859  0.002303 0.73  0.003292 0.001029 3.19837 
share0_9 -1.231078  0.360566 -3.41  -0.56065 0.16262 -3.4476 
fsu -0.1612506  0.094716 -1.7  -0.12096 0.04242 -2.8515 
_cons 1.30249  0.475412 2.74  0.341539 0.120543 2.83333 
      
Canada              
Number of observations  31         
Adjusted R2    0.9772         
              
log(emigr.(t-1)) 0.9112322  0.056362 16.17 0.948205 0.005152 184.038 
log(distance) 0.1235917  0.144609 0.85  0.079435 0.014197 5.59526 
gdppc 4.996796  1.802019 2.77  -0.3478 0.192514 -1.8066 
diffGDPPC -0.0196873  0.01354 -1.45  0.003295 0.001142 2.88634 
share0_9 3.326834  1.384513 2.4  -0.41424 0.184177 -2.2491 
fsu (dropped)        (dropped)    
_cons -2.544648  1.683802 -1.51  0.174407 0.123473 1.41252 
      
              
Western Europe             
Number of observations  715         
Adjusted R2    0.9428         
              
log(emigr.(t-1)) 0.9499063  0.010513 90.36 0.949327 0.004685 202.62 
log(distance) -0.0166239  0.021934 -0.76 -0.06864 0.011554 -5.9406 
gdppc -0.4328525  0.299416 -1.45  -0.45269 0.163145 -2.7747 
diffGDPPC -0.0012822  0.001874 -0.68  0.002171 0.000987 2.19839 
share0_9 -0.0721259  0.299602 -0.24  -0.29355 0.157932 -1.8587 
fsu -0.0836907  0.076452 -1.09  -0.11332 0.039927 -2.8383 
_cons -0.2934721  0.174033 -1.69  0.086892 0.099041 0.87733 
                    
USA              
Number of observations  639         
Adjusted R2    0.9459         
      
log(emigr.(t-1)) 0.9495672  0.012106 78.44 0.95159 0.004536 209.809 
log(distance) -0.1178772  0.043011 -2.74 -0.08774 0.014073 -6.2351 
gdppc -0.0491059  0.303473 -0.16  -0.3404 0.163846 -2.0776 
diffGDPPC 0.0022006  0.002361 0.93  0.003016 1.039721 0.0029 
share0_9 -0.2513813  0.324668 -0.77  -0.37386 0.161198 -2.3192 
fsu -0.0858835  0.068922 -1.25  -0.10325 0.038985 -2.6484 
_cons 0.544956  0.334606 1.63  0.284097 0.119296 2.38145 
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